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This paper develops a framework for analyzing the outcome of experiments carried out
on forward-looking subjects. Natural experiments, unexpected policy changes, and true
experiments are all included in the framework as special cases. These concepts are deﬁned in
conjunction with explicit notions of controlled and randomized experiments. The persistent
issues of sample-selection bias and heterogeneous impacts that surround interpretations of
experiments are endogenous to the model. Special attention is given to interpreting empirical
impact of the treatment within the model. The environments in which estimated mean
impacts correspond to mean subjective impacts are speciﬁed, and they are found to be a
small, uninteresting subset of environments contained within the framework.
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The Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments of the 1960s and 1970s economists were
expected to set economic policy analysis on a course of ever increasing conﬁdence and pre-
cision (Orcutt and Orcutt 1968). Yet, based on the methods and resources available at the
time, the NIT experiments failed to provide deﬁnitive measurement of the elasticity of labor
supply (Pencavel 1987). The experimental design did not clearly identify the parameters
of interest, and a host of econometric problems were encountered. This experience and the
steady growth of non-experimental data sources and econometric methods kept large-scale
experiments from becoming commonplace. By the late 1980s economists had become less
ambivalent about experiments, in part because the goals stated for social experiments had
become more modest. Social experiments are now more carefully designed to demonstrate
the impact of a particular policy change on selected outcomes (Meyer 1995 and Heckman
et. al 1999). Indeed, despite the failures of the NIT experiments, the potential power of
controlled experiments to solve problems of endogenous explanatory variables has inﬂuenced
non-experimental econometric analysis by placing great emphasis on so-called natural ex-
periments and the closely linked technique of instrumental variables.
This paper revisits the use of social experiments to identify parameters of a model of
individual behavior. The framework developed here addresses several problems that plagued
evaluations of the NIT and later experiments by building a model of how forward-looking
agents become eligible for an experiment and how they react to being randomly assigned
to receive treatment.1 This forward-looking model is compared to the static framework in
which experiments are typically discussed and analyzed. Several implications are presented
that suggest the intuition from the static model does not readily extend into the dynamic
model. In short, while random assignment to treatment alone is useful it is not suﬃcient on
1 The leading example of a controlled experiment designed to study and to be studied by
a uniﬁed model of individual behavior is Shearer’s (2001) experiment on incentives to carry
out hard physical labor (tree planting).
1its own to identify elements of the environment that are important for policy analysis.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to suggest that experimental impacts, while easy to interpret,
may be of limited value unless combined with a model that accounts for how subjects become
eligible for random assignment and why they respond to treatment. Hotz et. al (1999) ﬁnd
that results of one experiment are not good predictors of results of related but not identical
experiments. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Ichimura and Taber (2000) scrutinize
the randomization hypothesis underlying instrumental variables when used to make policy-
related inferences. Ichimura and Taber focus on a static simultaneous equations framework,
which has limited capacity to account for information available to subjects as they make
decisions. Rosenzweig and Wolpin use simple models to illustrate problems in interpreting
results based from natural experiments.
What is new in this paper is a uniﬁed framework for studying reactions to unanticipated
events. The formal deﬁnition of a social experiment developed here is suﬃciently precise to
describe a complete solution algorithm, alternative estimation procedures, and use of results
to analyze hypothetical policy changes. The deﬁnition is also suﬃciently general to include
designed experiments, ﬁeld trials, demonstration projects, unexpected policy changes, and
random acts of nature. As examples, four situations are mapped into the basic framework
to illustrate its ability to represent exogenous variation as it is usually portrayed in the
literature. For a complete application of the framework to analyze an experiment, see Ferrall
(2002b).
The model of individual behavior is a discrete-choice dynamic program, and as such
this paper relates closely to Rust (1994) which characterized the estimation of discrete-
choice Markov decision problems. Here three state variables are ﬁlled into the standard
model to account for experimental (or quasi-experimental) treatment. The standard model
is also extended to integrate unanticipated events, sample selection, observed and unobserved
heterogeneity, averaged data, and hypothetical uses of the results. While nearly all these
elements have appeared before in applications of discrete choice dynamic programming, they
2have been seen as extensions to the standard model of a homogeneous, stable environment
with random sampling and ﬁxed initial conditions. Here the elements of heterogeneity,
exogenous variation, and endogenous initial conditions are combined within a uniﬁed strategy
to solve, estimate, and apply a model.
As with any fully speciﬁed ‘structural’ model, a complete likelihood function for a sam-
ple of independent observations is generated, and some results concerning identiﬁcation of
the estimated parameters are provided. However, particular attention is also paid to esti-
mating the model using averaged data. There are three reasons. First, maximum likelihood
estimation on individual data demands the model be completely consistent with the experi-
ment and data collection. Rectifying even incidental discrepancies between the data and the
data generating process often requires costly increases in computation. Applying General-
ized Method of Moments (GGM) on averaged data smooths many discrepancies between the
model and reality, allowing a more parsimonious model. Second, use of averaged data means
the estimated model is nested by a atheoretic impact analysis. The social experiment model
becomes a null hypothesis about mean outcomes which, if not rejected, can replace the athe-
oretic analysis as an explanation of the experimental results. Of course, maximum likelihood
is itself a GMM estimator, so emphasizing GMM based on limited information is motivated
by a perception that structural estimation is a non-nested alternative to a simple analysis of
impact. Here it is emphasized that auxiliary assumptions can be viewed as testable against
an alternative that simply treats random assignment as exogenous variation. Third, many
controlled and natural experiments are studied with proprietary and conﬁdential data. In
these cases access to individual outcomes is limited. This paper emphasizes that limited
access to outcomes in evaluations of experiments does not in itself preclude estimation of a
rational model that can explain and predict experimental outcomes.
3II. Experiments and Econometrics
II.A Background
Heckman et al (1999) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) provide comprehensive surveys
of experimental and quasi-experimental studies in economics. Analysis begins by selecting
a result to study, denoted Y. The impact of treatment on Y is the diﬀerence ∆ between
Y conditional on assignment to the treatment group (g = 0) and assignment to the control
group (g = 1):2
∆ ≡ Y0 − Y1. (1)
∆ is treated as an unobserved random variable endogenous to many decisions made before
and after the experiment begins. In the extreme, when only the random assignment to
experimental groups is considered exogenous, the sample mean treatment eﬀect,
ˆ ∆ = ˆ E[Y0 | g = 0] − ˆ E[Y1 | g = 1] (2)
remains an unbiased estimate of the population mean individual treatment eﬀect:
E[ˆ ∆] = E[Y0 | g = 0] − E[Y1 | g = 1] = E[Y0] − E[Y1] = E[∆]. (3)
Thus ˆ ∆ answers an important question. Yet a well-run experiment raises more questions
than it answers. How would ∆ change if the ‘dose’ were increased or decreased? Or if
subjects were treated longer? How long after the end of the experiment do its eﬀects last?
When ∆ is taken as a primitive parameter, these questions are unanswerable. They are
answerable, however, within a model of behavior of the subjects in both the treatment and
control groups. The remainder of this section argues that this approach is valuable for several
other reasons.
2 Usually the subscript 1 denotes the treatment group, but using it to denote the control
group reﬂects more clearly the algorithm to solve the model.
4II.B Too Many Impacts
One advantage of using only mean treatment eﬀects from controlled experiments is that
they are easy to explain to politicians and other non-specialists (Burtless 1995). In the
textbook case, Y and ∆ are both scalars, and explaining the impact of a program would be
straightforward. In practice, several measurements are taken at diﬀerent points after random
assignment. If E[∆] is estimated for all of them, then Y is a vector that concatenates all
results of interest measured at each point in time. With a multi-dimensional impact vector,
no one statistic summarizes the outcome of the experiment. Because ∆ is not based on a
theory of how subjects react to the experiment, impact analysis provides no objective way
to aggregate variation across time or across impacts. The clarity of a scalar ∆ gives way to
a cloud of impacts out of which many diﬀerent and possibly conﬂicting conclusions might be
reached.
Although the number of measurements in an experiment is usually pre-determined, pre-
sumably the impact continues past this point. The reported impact vector ∆ itself does not
predict or forecast further results. Put succinctly, impact analysis is a method-of-moments
estimate with a free parameter for every result of interest (∆). This freedom leaves no power
to forecast behavior after the experiment or subsequent to (hypothetical) policy changes.
Correlations across impacts cannot be exploited to generate more eﬃcient estimates. In
the model developed here all results arise from one underlying model with a number of
parameters that are independent of the measurements take from the experiment. Impact
within the experiment can be projected beyond the measured sample into hypothetical situ-
ations, including policies not identical to the treatment and populations not included in the
experiment.
Another rhetorical advantage of using only ∆ is timeliness. An impact analysis can
be available almost as soon as the data are collected. In contrast, estimating a dynamic
model using data on individuals is notoriously time-consuming and sensitive to assumptions.
However, the advantages of social experiments apply equally well, if not more so, to a model-
5based analysis. The exogenous variation generated by the experiment compresses the length
of time and the size and diversity of the sample required to achieve a given precision in
parameter estimates.
II.C Sample-Selection and Heterogeneity Bias
Experiments are rarely conducted on randomly sampled members of the population of
interest. It is more cost-eﬀective to sample subjects who are most likely to respond to the
treatment. This limits the extent to which results of an experiment apply to the unselected
population. In addition, while the mean treatment eﬀect is non-parametrically identiﬁed
from a controlled experiment, it is unlikely that the mean summarizes the implications for
policy (Heckman and Smith 1995). The problems of sample-selection and heterogeneous
impacts are two aspects of the more fundamental problem of heterogeneity in unobserved
parameters, which include preferences and lagged decisions. If, in a given experiment, these
issues seem exceptionally large, they can be avoided by narrowing the question of interest
to the eﬀect of treatment on the treated.
In contrast, a model of the experiment (if it is good) applies in both the treatment and
control groups, both inside and outside the experiment. From the point of view of a subject,
∆ is a random variable that depends on: the state the subject was in at the point of random
assignment, realized events between random assignment and the point of measurement, and
the subject’s optimal response to the experimental treatment. In short, permanent and
transitory heterogeneity in treatment eﬀects is also endogenous to the model even before
introducing parameter heterogeneity across subjects. As long as the selection criteria for
the experiment are clear and relatively simple, correcting for sample selection becomes an
implication of the model.
II.D Experiments and Policy
The fundamental question posed by an experiment is:
6If the treatment were to replace the status quo and became policy, would the
experimental results predict the real results?
This is diﬀerent than the more narrow ‘what if’ questions raised early, because they could,
in principle, be answered by a larger or longer experiment that varied parameters. But any
social experiment must be ﬁnite-lived, voluntary, and without an open window of opportunity
to enter treatment. A policy, on the other hand, applies in the future to subjects not eligible
at the time the policy was announced. It may be available repeatedly, and it may not
be voluntary. Because experimental treatment is a one-shot temporary intervention, the
subjects of an experiment all anticipate a return to a world without treatment. The status
quo policy is de facto the terminal state for both the treatment and control groups.
From the beginning this limitation was noted, and Orcutt and Orcutt (1968) suggested
that varying the treatment period may identify the size of the terminal bias in treatment.
However, if the current policy were eliminated, the sample selected into an experiment comes
from a world which would no longer exist. The initial conditions themselves cannot be treated
away. Without a reliable model of behavior under the status quo it is not possible to correct
for sample selection bias in real policy forecasts solely based on the experimental results.
But if the experimental treatment were implemented, it would modify the status quo and
by that fact alone modify the impact of the program. When combined with the other issues
left unresolved by random assignment alone, status quo bias in both the initial and terminal
conditions of an experiment make it nearly impossible to project experimental results into
policy predictions without a model of behavior to explain reaction to the treatment.
III. The Social Environment
Before describing an experiment it is necessary to describe the environment in which the
experiment takes place. The environment is called ‘social’ not because individuals interact,
although such interactions can be incorporated into the framework (see VII). Rather, poli-
7cies parameters and other aspects of the setting outside the experiment aﬀect the results
generated by the experiment, and in this sense the social situation aﬀects the outcome of an
experiment.
III.A Notation
Greek letters denote vectors and structural parameters of the model (elements of the
exogenous vector). Capital Greek letters are typically the concatenation of vectors with the
corresponding lower-case letter. A concatenation of items can also be denoted [xn], where xn
could be a scalar, a vector or a set. Lower-case Roman letters denote individual elements of
vectors; capital Roman letters denote policy parameters or the maximum value of a variable
with corresponding lower-case letter; bold capital letters denote sets.
The cardinality of a set S is denoted |S|, and the length of a vector v is denoted |v|. The
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The Boolean (indicator) function is denoted
B[z] ≡
½
0 z is false
1 z is true.
(5)
If θ is a vector, then θ
¯ ¯
¯
x=5,y=3 means that the elements of θ named x and y are to be set to
5 and 3, respectively. When the variable being set is clear from the value being assigned, its












¬x is deﬁned as the vector excluding the
variable x.
III.B Subject Behavior
The model of subject behavior is a discrete-state, discrete-choice dynamic program.3
Each period the subject is in a state θ, an element of the state space Θ. Each period
3 The framework can be extended to include approximation of a state space where some
state variables take on a continuum of values using methods described in, for example, Rust
(1997). A continuous state space is often assumed so as to smooth the model’s predic-
tions. Other approaches to smoothness are integrated into this framework and may make a
continuous state space unnecessary.
8the subject chooses an action vector α from a set of feasible actions A(θ). A choice-state
combination (α,θ) is referred to as an outcome. The value of an outcome is written
v(α,θ) = U(α,θ)+ δE[V(θ0)] = U(α,θ)+ δ
X
θ0
P {θ0 |α, θ}V(θ0), (6)
and depends on the one-period utility U(α,θ), the discount factor δ, and the outcome-to-state
transition probability P {θ0 |α, θ}. V(θ0) is the value of entering state θ0 given that an optimal
decision will be made then and for all future periods:
∀θ ∈ Θ, V (θ) = max
α∈A(θ) v(α,θ). (7)
The dynamic program in (6) and (7) can describe environments in which no unexpected
events occur to subjects. Yet the essence of an experiment is that subjects do not anticipate
treatment. More notation is required to account for the exogenous and unexpected aspects
of an experiment. For this purpose it proves useful to think of the state vector θ as the
concatenation of ﬁve sub-vectors, each of which contains state variables that play speciﬁc
roles in the model:
θ ≡
³





(t r f ) (g e) (··· d k) (Λ Γ) [Ψp[d]]
´
.
The ‘pol’ vector contains parameters describing current public policies that aﬀect subjects.
The ‘exog’ vector contains preference and technology parameters; ‘end’ contains the variables
typically thought of as state variables, i.e. those endogenous to the subject’s problem (6)-
(7). These variables pertain to the world outside the experiment. The ellipsis indicates
that the modeler chooses the elements of the endogenous vector except for the required
variables d and k, which are described below. The remaining two sub-vectors describe the
subject’s situation inside the experiment, and they are deﬁned in the next section. Outside
the experiment the values of θclock and θexp are transparent to the subject. The required
state variables within each sub-vector that are listed above will be deﬁned as the role of each
sub-vector is described.
9When the state and action spaces are large, the transition P {θ0 |α, θ} becomes exceed-
ingly complex if allowed to take an arbitrary form. On the other hand, any restrictions
on the transition must not rule out common speciﬁcations. To balance these concerns the
evolution of state variables is described with some special notation.
Deﬁnition 1. A discrete jump process q0 = q?(¯ q,[πj],[Qj]) means ∀(α,θ),


















B[q0 = ¯ q(α,θ)]. (9)
In words, q?(¯ q,[πj],[Qj]) means that the next realized value of q is either the default
value ¯ q (a scalar) or jumps into one of J sets Qj with corresponding probability πj. The
notation [Qj] emphasizes that the jump sets are organized into a vector parallel to the
vector of probabilities, [πj]. The probability of the default event is 1 −
P
j πj, although the
default value can appear in the jump sets, so ¯ q may be more likely to occur than the default
event itself. Within each jump set the values are equally likely: πj/|Qj|. This is assumed
without loss of generality, because the modeler has the option of specifying each jump set as
a singleton. Note that (9) makes it explicit that the arguments of the jump process depend
on the current outcome (α,θ).
Examples A discrete jump process q ∈ θ is:
¦ absorbing at n if q = n → q0 = q?(n,[0],[∅]);
¦ invariant if q is absorbing for all values q = 1,2,...,Q;
¦ autonomous [at θ] if [at θ] q? is not a function of α;
¦ independent [at q = n] if (q = n implies) q? is not a function of α or any other
state variable s 6= q;
¦ ergodic [at θ] if for n = 1,2,...,Q, ∃αn ∈ A(θ) : P{q0 = n | (αn,θ)} > 0;








, [{1} ··· {Q}]
´
;
¦ dependent if q is not ergodic, but for any two values q?,q??, there exists a chain
of outcomes (α1,θ1),(α2,θ2),...,(αm,θm), m < Q−1, with corresponding values of q
10such that P {q0 = q?? | } > 0, P
n
q0 = qm | (αm−1,θm−1)
o
> 0, ..., P
©




To show the ﬂexibility of this notation, consider one further example. Suppose that q
is iid at states where some other variable z is 0. Otherwise, q retains its current value. For
example, q might be an index for job oﬀers in a search model. While unemployed (z = 0),
job oﬀers arrive iid from a discrete distribution, but while employed (z = 1) the oﬀer stays
constant at its current value. Using the discrete jump notation, this process is described as
q?
³
q , B[z = 0]
h




, [{1} {2} ··· {Q}]
´
. (10)
Multiplying the vector of jump probabilities by the scalar B[z = 0] makes the probability
of the default (and current) value equal 1 when z 6= 0. If the model speciﬁes that z is
ergodic, this means that for any employed state there exists at least one action that will lead
to a positive probability of unemployment. Here q is dependent on z at employed states.
Although q itself is not ergodic, its dependence on z keeps the overall transition ergodic.
Invariant states as deﬁned above diﬀer across individuals but are ﬁxed for a given in-
dividual. The set of invariant states partition the state space. That is, there exist a set of
subsets in which all the invariant states are constant, and the state of any subject in one of
these subsets remains in the subset forever.
Requirement 1. Transitions and Choice Probabilities.
R1a. 0 < δ < 1; U(α,θ) is a smooth function of a vector of exogenous parameters
Υ ∈ U ⊂ <
N1; P {θ0 |α, θ} is a smooth function of a vector Π ∈ P ⊂ <
N2 of
exogenous parameters; U and P are bounded open sets.
R1b. For all Π ∈ P each variable q ∈ θ follows a discrete jump process that is invariant,
ergodic, or dependent.
R1c. State-contingent choice probabilities are smoothed by a logistic kernel with pa-
11rameter 0 < ρ < 1:
˜ v(α,θ) ≡ B[α ∈ A(θ)]exp
½
ρ
1 − ρ [v(α,θ) − V (θ)]
¾




From R1 the complete transition function can be described. Let h index variables in θ
and let the discrete jump process for state variable θ[h] be written θ[h]?(¯ h,[πh
j],[Hj]). Then

























Combining choice and transition probabilities generates a complete state-to-state transition
Ps {θ0 |θ} =
X
α∈A(θ)






































III.C Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity
A group of subjects that, for the purposes of the model and the experiment, share
observable characteristics that do not vary over time is called a demographic group and is
indexed by d ∈ θend. The number of demographic groups, D, is pre-determined and ﬁnite.
In addition, subjects are also divided into K pre-determined groups indexed by k ∈ θend
and sharing unobserved characteristics. A subject’s demographic group and unobserved
type completely specify their environment outside the experiment. For example, suppose
a model is posited in which income tax rates depend on location but a subject’s location
is not determined endogenously by α and is taken as given in the analysis. Location is
then a demographic variable. Each unique combination of location and the values of other
demographic variables would deﬁne a demographic group. Further, the model posits that
subjects diﬀer in the marginal utility of leisure, which is also treated as given in the model
12but not directly observable to others. Neither government policy nor the experiment cannot
directly treat subjects diﬀerently based on marginal utility, so each value of it would help
deﬁne an unobserved type.
Individuals who diﬀer in observed ways are likely to diﬀer in unobserved ways. Although
d is an index of ﬁxed exogenous variation, it is problematic to limit the correlation between
it and the underlying preference parameters indexed by k. Continuing the marginal tax rate
example, people with low marginal utility of leisure may choose to live in locales with low
income taxes. One solution is to model all results of interest including d itself. This may not
be feasible, and it can detract from a focus on the experimental results. A second solution
is to let exogenous variables be parametric functions of observed characteristics and other
‘deeper’ estimated parameters. This creates a hybrid model in which some parameters are
related to observed characteristics and some are not. The middle-ground strategy adopted
here assumes non-parametric unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman and Singer 1984) and
mixture probabilities that depend on the demographic index d. The advantages of this
assumption over a hybrid model will be described below.
Requirement 2. Exogenous Parameters.
R2a. θend contains exactly two invariant states, denoted d and k, and taking on positive
integer values up to D and K, respectively.
R2b. The exogenous parameters of a subject’s problem (6)-(7) are collected in a vector
of size N = N1 + N2 +2 that is speciﬁc to each type k:
Γ[k] ≡ (Υk Πk δk ρk). (14)
R2c. U(α,θ) and P {θ0 |α, θ} are (not necessarily smooth) functions of a vector Ψp of
policy instruments. The policy vector θpol takes on exactly one value (and so is
invariant) and consists of D sub-vectors indexed by d:
θpol ≡ (Ψp[1] Ψp[2] ··· Ψp[D]). (15)
13R2d. The (invariant) proportion of the population with a given combination (k d)
equals ¯ λ[d]λ[d,k], where: ¯ λ[d] ∈ Ψp[d]; λ[d,k] ∈ θexog; ¯ λ ∈ ΞD; and λ[d] ∈ ΞK for all d.
R2e. Outside an experiment θclock and θexp are single valued and have no aﬀect on
U(α,θ) and PP {θ0 |α, θ}.
R2f. The exogenous vector has length P = K(D + N) and takes on exactly one value,
deﬁned in three ways:
θexog ≡ (λ[1,1] ···Λ[D,K] Υ1 Π1 δ1 ρ1 ··· ΥK ΠK δK ρK )
≡ (Λ[1] Λ[2]··· Λ[D] Γ[1] ··· Γ[K])
≡ (Λ Γ). (16)










The exogenous vector contains all parameters of the model to be estimated from data.
The ˆ is included in ˆ Θexog to avoid confusing the set of valid estimates of θexog and the set of
values that the exogenous vector takes on in a social experiment, which is by deﬁnition the
singleton {θexog}. If the parameters Γ and proportions Λ are estimated freely, then compli-
cated correlations between policy parameters and demographic variables are possible, and
membership in group d can be considered a lagged endogenous choice. A policy experiment
that changes values in θpol without changing ¯ Λ or Λ assumes that the policy change would
not invoke a response in demographic variables. However, mixing probabilities can be ad-
justed along with policy parameters if there is other evidence on how d would respond to
changes in θpol.
The primitive outcome-to-state transition and the endogenous choice probabilities com-
bine to generate the state-to-state transition Ps in (13). By requiring that k and d are indices
for all invariant (non-ergodic) endogenous variables, a stationary (or ergodic) distribution
14over the state space is determined by Ps, ¯ Λ, and Λ. This stationary distribution, denoted
P−∞(θ), describes the population prior to the experiment.
Implication 1: Ergodic and smooth probabilities. Under R1-R2:
I1a. There exists a unique distribution P−∞{θ} such that
∀d,k, ¯ λ[d]λ[d,k] =
X
θ0
B[k = k0,d = d0]P−∞{θ0} (18)
∀θ ∈ Θ, P−∞{θ} =
X
θ0
Ps {θ|θ0 }P−∞{θ0}. (19)
I1b. P {α|θ}, Ps {θ0 |θ} and P−∞ are smooth functions of θexog on ˆ Θexog.
Proof.
P1a. Since Θ and A(θ) are both ﬁnite sets, U(α,θ) is bounded. By R1.1 unique values
of v(α,θ) and V(θ) solve the contraction (6)-(7). By R1.3 all feasible actions
have non-zero choice probabilities at each state. Combined with R1.2 and R2.1
the state-to-state transition Ps is ‘irreducible’ over all states in θend excluding d
and k. Thus a unique stationary distribution over these states exists (e.g. see
Theorem 3.11.1 in Judd 1998). By R2.4-6 all other elements of the state vector
are single-valued, so a unique P−∞(θ) exists for which (18) and (19) hold.
P1b. From R2.3, R1.3, and envelope theorems on the dynamic program, P {α|θ} and Ps
are smooth functions of θexog. Since P−∞ uniquely solves a set of linear equations
in Ps it also is smooth in θexog.
These results are nearly the same as Rust’s (1994) smoothness results, except in three
respects. Rust speciﬁes an error term (often extreme value) in the utility with inﬁnite
support to ensure smooth choice probabilities. Instead, the approach followed by Eckstein
and Wolpin (1999) and others is followed here by smoothing choice probabilities without an
error term in the utility. The state space for the subject’s problem therefore remains discrete
(and bounded). Second, Rust assumed a ‘transparent’ environment (deﬁned below) and was
not concerned with sampling from an endogenous distribution over the state space. Third,
15in Rust the observed component of the state vector could follow an arbitrary transition that
could include absorbing states. Here, extra structure is placed on the transition to guarantee
an ergodic distribution.
III.D Measurements
From a subject’s point of view the outcome (α,θ) completely describes their current
situation and what can be known about the future. Realistically the experimenter cannot
observe all the aspects of an individual’s current outcome. Furthermore, social experiments
are carried out on selected populations, and selection is based on observed characteristics of
the subjects. A description of what is observed (or measured) by the experimenter is made
an integral part of the model. Measurements are also called results.
Requirement 3. Measurements.
R3a. Y : A(Θ) ×Θ → <M is the measured result vector generated by outcomes. Y(α,θ)
does not include k or θexog.
R3b. The state variables in the vectors θobs and θcond, deﬁned as
θobs ≡ (θexp d) = (g e d) (20)
θcond ≡ (t θobs) = (t g e d), (21)
are by deﬁnition observed but excluded from Y(α,θ).
R3c. Sample information is contained in y = [y(θobs)], where y(θobs) is a vector,
y(θobs) = [yn(θobs)], and where yn(θobs) is a panel of measurements for subject n in
measurement group θobs. That is, y(θobs) = [yn(θcond)] and yn(θcond) corresponds
to Y(α,θ) for subject n in period t.
R3d. The number of subjects in each group is denoted N (θobs). Missing information
is denoted ˙ y. The number of observations available in a conditioning period is
denoted N (θcond) =
PN(θobs)
n=1 B[yn(θcond) 6= ˙ y].
16The expected measured result conditional on arriving at state θ is




Since there is an ergodic distribution, there is a constant expected outcome within each
observed group. That is,




B[d = d0]E[Y | θ0]P−∞{θ0}/¯ λ[d] (23)
is the mean status quo result before an experiment is carried out. It is not necessary to
sum over elements of the state vector outside of θexog because the requirements so far have
ensured that in the social environment they are either single-valued or have no eﬀect on
subject behavior.
Deﬁnition 2. Social Environment. A social environment
V ( Θ, A(θ), U(α,θ), P {θ0 |α, θ}, Y(α,θ), y )
includes a state space, action sets, a utility, a transition, a measurement, and data that
satisfy R1-R3.
Examples. A social environment V is
¦ autonomous if no subject can aﬀect the future: ∀(α,θ), P {θ0 |α, θ} = P {θ0 |θ};
¦ myopic if no subject places value on future states: ∀k, δk ≈ 0;
¦ static if it is autonomous or myopic;
¦ irrational if ∀k, ρ ≈ 0;
¦ homogeneous if K = 1;





In a myopic environments subjects do not care about the future, while in an autonomous
environment they may care about the future but cannot inﬂuence it. In either case the future
17is irrelevant to decisions made today so Pa {α|θ} is a function of U(α,θ) alone and we might
call the environment static. In an irrational environment choice probabilities are equal for
all feasible choices, so measured results are unrelated to the value of actions.
In a homogeneous environment, subjects in the same demographic group have identical
problems and identical conditional choice probabilities. In a transparent environment the
observer has the same information about the distribution over next period’s state as the
subject, except for the permanent values k and θexog. A weaker assumption (not listed
above) is conditional homogeneity. In this case subjects that share some observed qualities,
including perhaps measured outcomes before random assignment, also share unobserved type
with high probability. This assumption relates to matching estimators described in Heckman
et al. (1998) and the assumption of ‘unconfoundedness’ in Hotz et a. (1999). That is, in
a conditionally homogeneous environment, pre-assignment outcomes can be used to control
for endogenous selection of subjects into a non-experimental program.
IV. The Experiment
IV.A Treatment
An experiment introduces into a social environment a program of treatment that takes
place in a ﬁnite number of phases each with a ﬁnite maximum duration. A subject’s status
in the program is described by the sub-vector θclock in (8). There are three required clock
variables, the phase of treatment, f, the time spent residing in the phase so far, r, and the
experimental period, t, at which measurements for the current outcome will be made. Before
a subject enters treatment they are in phase f = 0, which corresponds to the ‘real world’ of
the social environment. After completing treatment a subject enters the last phase f = F,
which in some cases is the same as phase 0. Within a phase, r determines the future course
of treatment but not current utility. A phase between 0 and F lasts at most R[f] periods.
18The experimental time t does not aﬀect a subject and is used to coordinate outcomes across
experimental groups.
The results for a subject determine the course of treatment, and based on the subject’s
information the clock setting next period is deterministic. Since all new state transitions
created by the experiment are excluded from the social environment V, the model requires
that all eﬀects of treatment enter through adjustments to the utility or transition as functions
of the experimental clock. Parameters of the treatment that may be subject to hypothetical
variation are collected in a vector Ψt.
Requirement 4. Program of Treatment.
R4a. The treatment vector takes the form:
Ψt = (R f+(y;θclock) ···) (24)
where R is a F − 1 vector of positive integers denoting the maximum length of
phases f = 1,2,...,F − 1, and f+(y;θclock) is the phase increment next period.
U(α,θ) and P {θ0 |α, θ} are functions of the remaining (modeler-speciﬁed) ele-
ments of Ψt, which can interact with the current phase f and treatment group
g.
R4b. Treatment is deterministic: ∀ (α,θ) : 0 < f < F,
f0 = f?(f + B[r = R[f]]+ f+,0,∅) (25)
r0 = r?(B[f+ = 0,r < R[f]]r +1,0,∅) (26)
t0 = t?(t+1,0,∅). (27)
R4c. Treatment is progressive: f ≤ f + f+ ≤ F and f < f + f+ when r = R[f].
R4d. Utility and the transition of state variables (other than those in θclock) are unaf-
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19The transition rules for treatment are simpler than the notation might suggest. The
phase next period can only depend on θclock and the measurement vector Y(α,θ), because
the experimenter must be able to set the phase based on observed results. If a subject has
not reached R[f], their next phase can be the current phase (f+ = 0) or some other further
phase (f+ > 0), including the post-treatment phase (f+ = F − f). When r = R[F] the only
diﬀerence is that the default phase becomes f +1 rather than f. The discrete jump process
for r simply says that r0 = r + 1 if the phase next period will be the same as this period.
Otherwise r = 1. Since the treatment program is deterministic given measurements and
group assignment, it follows that r and f can be determined for a subject based on the data
generated, yn(θcond).
Examples of treatment.
A phase 1 ≤ f < F −1 is
¦ a qualiﬁcation phase if ∀(α,θ), U(α,θ) = U(α,θ)
¯
¯ ¯




¦ autonomous if f+ = 0;
¦ a waiting period if it is an autonomous qualiﬁcation phase;
¦ an entry period if it is a waiting period and f = 1;
¦ voluntary if ∀ θ ∃α ∈ A(θ) : f + B[r = R[f]]+ f+ = F.
In a qualiﬁcation phase, utility is untreated, although the course of treatment may
depend on results. In an autonomous phase the course of treatment does not depend on
results. Combining these two properties results in a waiting period, and a waiting period
at the beginning of an experiment is an entry period. The program of treatment does not
specify how subjects enter treatment. Nor does it describe what happens once treatment
ends by entering phase F. These are elements of an experiment associated with treatment
groups which are deﬁned next.
20IV.B Experimental Groups and Policy Innovations
Each subject is associated with an experimental status described by the sub-vector θexp
introduced in (8). A single experiment might include multiple treatment groups and multiple
criteria for entry. For example, subjects may be assigned diﬀerent doses of the treatment or
face diﬀerent selection criteria. Diﬀerences across groups must be accounted for by either
treatment status (g) or initial conditions (e). The control group is by deﬁnition g = G. In
a simple experiment G = 1 and the treatment group is designated g = 0. When G > 1
more than one treatment group share the same control group. Upon random assignment
the control group transits directly to f = F. Treatment groups begin with an initial clock
setting ¯ θclock(θexp).
Experimental (or measurement) time t has to be synchronized across experimental groups
because random assignment may occur after diﬀerent selection criteria. Sample selection in
a group e occurs in a range of periods, [tmin(e),t0(e)]. The length of the selection period
T(e) = t0(e) − tmin is speciﬁed by the modeler. Random assignment occurs at the end of
t0, which is normalized to 0 in one group and is less than zero for all other groups. Post-
assignment measurements are made in the range [t0+1,tmax]. Because selection occurs before
assignment to treatment, the data process begins before treatment starts, before subjects
are aware that they will take part in an experiment.
The modeler deﬁnes which results are feasible for each conditioning point in the ex-
periment, θcond deﬁned in (21). Valid measurements are indicated with a Boolean function
H[y;θcond]. A non-valid measurement implies selection out of the sample, and prior to
random assignment lead to ineligibility for the experiment. The criteria may diﬀer across
experimental groups, but not between treatments and controls for the same treatment. For
example, suppose treatment group e requires six periods of non-employment to be eligible for
random assignment. Then T(e) = 6. If z is an indicator for employment then t ≤ t0 implies
H[y;θcond] = 1 − B[z]. Note that the state space must be constructed so that the selection
criteria can be represented as a sequence of feasible results that subjects must satisfy. In this
21example z must be an element of y or directly inferable from it. The state space need not
be expanded so that the complete criteria be computable from y. In this case, for example,
it is unnecessary to include ﬁve lagged values of z so that eligibility for the experiment can
be deduced from a single result vector y. Post-assignment histories may also be selected if
subjects can be lost due to attrition.
Subjects who meet eligibility requirements for group e are assigned a value of g according
to a discrete jump process, g = g?(g,[µg],[g]). Recall that the arguments of g? can depend
upon the current outcome (α,θ). Thus, we can require that for t 6= t0 group assignment
is invariant:
P
µg = 0. Jump probabilities are speciﬁed only apply at t = t0. In a true
experiment the probability µg is under the control of the experimenter, which implies that
µg can only be a function of d, e, and the result vector Y(α,θ). A ‘randomized experiment’
µg only depends on e and would thus equal the sample proportions of each treatment gorup.
At the other extreme, group assignment is under the direct control of the subject. The value
of g would be directly determined by the action vector α. Note, however, that the subject
does not get to choose the date of assignment t0.
True experiments are usually of interest because they inform policy decisions. It is pre-
sumed that the question,“How would the treatment aﬀect the population if it were policy?”
will be asked of any experiment. This framework distinguishes between an experiment and
an unexpected change in policy, which will be called a policy innovation. An experiment is a
temporary one-time application of a treatment to a selected population. Potential subjects
unwittingly become eligible for treatment by making choices under the status quo. Treat-
ment will end and all subjects return to the status quo environment. A policy innovation
is a permanent application of a treatment to all eligible members of the population. The
population is informed of the program of treatment and can enter treatment at any point
they become eligible, either now or in the future.
The case e = 0 is reserved for policy innovations. A policy innovation is a new social envi-
ronment that embeds the treatment into the status quo. A policy innovation has a short-run,
22non-stationary eﬀect while the treated choice probabilities operate on the untreated state
distribution generated by the old regime. When considering long-run eﬀects, there is a con-
ﬂict between the deﬁnitions of a social environment and a program of treatment. Treatment
programs are of a ﬁnite length. Social environments are inﬁnite. A ﬁnite treatment has
no long-run impact in an ergodic environment. In contrast, when a treatment program is
turned into a policy members of the population can expect to enter treatment any time they
satisfy some criteria. To embed a ﬁnite treatment in an inﬁnite social environment, policy
innovations will be recurring treatments. A member of the population that completes treat-
ment enters phase F and then becomes eligible for treatment again by moving back to phase
0. For simplicity, the transition from F to 0 occurs with a constant probability τ(g). The
subject moves to phase 1 if they satisfy the criteria for treatment. This restores stationary
to the environment while retaining the ﬁnite nature of treatment.
Requirement 5. Experimental Groups




0() ¯ θclock τ
´
, (30)
where: T(e) is the length of the selection period before random assignment;
H[y;θcond] ∈ {0,1} is an indicator for whether y is a feasible measurement at point
θcond; g?
0() is the discrete jump process for g at random assignment; ¯ θclock(θexp) is
the clock setting just after random assignment; and τ(g) is the treatment recur-
rence probability.
R5b. For g = G, ¯ θclock = (t0 +1 1 F ). Based on T(e) and other values of ¯ θclock,
observations are split into pre- and post-assignment periods, tmin(e) ≤ t0(e) ≤
0 ≤ tmax(e), as described in the Appendix. Entry group assignment takes an iid
discrete jump at ¯ t ≡ mine tmin(e) −1; group assignment takes place at t0:
E > 0,t = ¯ t → e0 = e?(e,1/E,[e]) (31)
t 6= tmin → e0 = e?(e,0,∅) (32)
23t 6= t0 → g0 = g?(g,0,∅) (33)
t = t0 → g0 = g?
0(). (34)
R5c. Given e, no selection occurs before t0 and feasible measurements before random
assignment are the same in all treatment groups:
t < tmin(e) → H[y;θcond] = 1




R5d. Pre-treatment status recurs with probability B[e = 0,g < G]τ(g):
f = F → f0 = f?(F,B[e = 0,g < G]τ(g),0). (36)
For e > 0, a transition out of phase 0 is never expected: f = 0 < e → f0 =
f?(f,0,∅). For e = 0, the transition occurs when the subject meets the earliest
eligibility standard of any other entry group (see the Appendix).
A social experiment is simply a collection of one or more treatment and entry groups
applied to a social environment.
Deﬁnition 3. Social experiment. A social experiment E (Ψx,Ψt,V) is a program of
treatment and a set of experimental groups applied to a social environment V that satisfy
R1-R5.
Examples. A treatment group or experiment is










¦ selected if T > 0 and there exists y and θcond such H[y;θcond] 6= 1;
¦ randomized if at t = t0, g? is an iid discrete jump process;
¦ a policy innovation if e = 0, and is recurring if τ > 0;
24¦ natural if it is a non-recurring policy innovation and g corresponds to subsets of
d: ∀g ∃Dg ⊆ {0,1,...,D} : t = t0,d ∈ D˜ g → g0 = g?(˜ g,0,∅);
¦ naturally randomized if it is natural and for all d ∈ Dg, there exists a d0 ∈ DG:
Ψp[d] = Ψp[d0] and Λ[d] = Λ[d0].
An experiment is a surprise change in the environment which alters rational behavior
from that point on. A policy innovation is a surprise change in the environment that becomes
part of the environment. The diﬀerence between a true experiment (e > 0) and a policy
innovation (e = 0) is that a subject of an experiment has only one unanticipated chance at
treatment. If subjects of a true experiment are not eligible for treatment when the experiment
occurs then they are never eligible again. In a policy innovation an individual knows that the
treatment will be available (or mandatory) in the future. The diﬀerence between a recurring
(τ > 0) and non-recurring (τ = 0) innovation is that in a recurring innovation receipt of
treatment does not preclude receiving it later on.
In a controlled experiment those assigned to the control group act exactly as they would
have if they had not been selected from the population in the ﬁrst place. They also act
(conditional on the current state) as the treatment groups will act after treatment ends.
This rules out Hawthorne and placebo eﬀects. R5.3 and randomization ensure that the
distribution over states at random assignment are identical across treatment groups, but not
necessarily across experimental groups due to diﬀerences in selection criteria. An experiment
may be controlled but not randomized if g is correlated with endogenous states. Since θexog
contains d and k, randomization requires that assignment to g is uncorrelated with both
observed and unobserved types. Independence is required just prior to applying the ﬁrst
selection criterion for e.
In all types of experiments phase 0 and phase F have inﬁnite horizons. With τ = 0 an
individual knows that they leave phase 0 and enter treatment only once. Since treatment is
progressive they eventually enter the absorbing phase F, which in this case is the environment
25before the innovation or experiment. With τ > 0 the previous environment is replaced
altogether because in phase F the positive probability of undergoing treatment again aﬀects
the value of choices. The value of choices in phase F aﬀect the value of choices in f = 0,
and vice versa. The value function and choice probabilities in these two phases must be
computed simultaneously in all phases. If S denotes the size of the endogenous state space




¬d,k), then S is the size of the state space for a single
subject in the status quo environment. A recurring policy innovation expands the state space
for a single subject to S × S ×
QF−1
f=1 R[f].
Implication 2: Natural experiments as controlled and randomized experiments.
I2a. A natural experiment is not randomized.
I2b. A natural experiment conducted on a myopic environment is controlled.
Proof.
P5a. In a natural experiment g is directly related to d ∈ θend, and is thus not iid at t0.
P5b. Immediate.
Prior to random assignment subjects of a policy innovation can anticipate assignment
and would (presumably) make diﬀerent decisions than in the post-treatment phase. In a
dynamic environment there is no way to guarantee that a natural experiment is controlled
without specifying more aspects of the social environment. In a myopic environment subjects
do not anticipate the future so even if they are informed of the policy innovation they will act
the same before random assignment as after any treatment ends. Technically, the deﬁnition
of randomization cannot be satisﬁed by a natural experiment. Thus a naturally randomized
experiment is deﬁned as a natural experiment where assignment to treatment group is based
on an demographic variable that is irrelevant to the policy vector.
There are a two types of situations often referred to as natural experiments which, in
this framework, would be classiﬁed as a true experiment (E > 0) or not as an experiment
at all. First, the temporary expiration of a policy that one can credibly model as unantici-
26pated in the status quo environment. Although this situation is not designed it meets all the
other requirements of a deliberate experiment. Such a situation is controlled if there exists
some demographic group not aﬀected by the temporary expiration but which is modelled as
identical (in a policy sense) as the aﬀected group. On the other hand, an ordinary policy in-
novation such as raising the minimum wage does not ﬁt as an experiment in this framework.
As with a natural experiment, assignment to treatment is based on a demographic charac-
teristic. Subjects enter ‘treatment’ by being aﬀected by the new minimum wage. Unless
the change is temporary agents in the treatment group will modify behavior permanently
even in the status quo. In addition, outcomes in the post-treatment phase are dependent
on treatment since subjects can expect to be aﬀected by the minimum wage at some future
date. Within this framework, a permanent change in policy should be modelled as a recur-
rent policy innovation: E = 0 and τ > 0. Under conditions on the social environment similar
to those for a natural experiment, such a policy innovation can still end up being controlled.
IV.C Examples of Social Experiments
Before considering the properties of impact analysis and other econometric techniques
applied to a social experiment as deﬁned here, the practical use of the framework is illustrated
by mapping four situations into it.
IV.C.1 The Illinois Re-employment Bonus Experiment
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) report the results of two controlled experiments carried
out on new claimants to unemployment insurance (UI) in Illinois. Meyer’s (1995) review of
the evidence from these and related experiments suggests an on-going inﬂuence of such
experiments and the analysis of their results. The two experiments were based on the same
entry conditions and shared a common control group, thus G = 3. In each case the treatment
consisted of a cash bonus for ﬁnding a job within 11 weeks of beginning their claim. In one
treatment group the bonus was paid to the employee. In the other it was paid to the
27employer. It was indeed an unexpected experimental intervention with a ﬁnite duration,
thus E > 0. There were not multiple samples with diﬀerent entry conditions, thus E = 1.
The main selection criterion was that the subject ﬁled a new UI claim and registered in a
job service area in northern and central Illinois. The claimant also needed to qualify for
26 or more weeks of UI and to be between the ages of 20 and 55. For simplicity we will
assume that location and age are treated as demographic variables in order to concentrate
on the unemployment criteria. Let m,j ∈ Y(α,θ) be indicators for employment status and
registering at a job service bureau in the current period (week), respectively. Let n ∈ Y(α,θ)
be the number of weeks of UI eligibility if unemployed next period. The modeler decides
whether and to what extent these variables are under the control of the subject by locating
them in θ or α or by making them functions of other elements of the outcome. The length
of the selection period is thus T = 2: the date of random assignment is t0 = 0 and selection
begins at tmin = −1. The selection criteria are, for t = −1, H=[y;θcond]m(n > 26) and, for
t = 0, H[y;θcond] = j(1 − m).
There are three phases of treatment (F = 4). Phase f = 1 is the period during which
the subject can qualify for the employment bonus. They must start a job within 11 weeks of
entry into the experiment, while receiving UI beneﬁts for the spell of unemployment at the
start of the experiment. This implies R[1] = 11. The phase increment is f+ = m until r = 11,
when it becomes f+ = 2(1 − m). That is, the person stays in the qualiﬁcation phase as long
as they don’t start working. If they reach the ﬁnal period they move to phase 4 if they
don’t work, otherwise they make the default transition to f = 2. The second phase (f = 2)
requires the subject to hold the job for four periods, thus R[2] = 4. The phase increment is
f+ = 2(1 − m) for r < 4 because if they failed to keep the job for four weeks they lost the
chance to receive the bonus and moved back to the real world. At r = 4 the phase increment
is f+ = 1 − m. Phases 1 and 2 are qualiﬁcation phases because the utility and transition
are not treated during them. The last treatment phase lasts one period, R[3] = 1, and is
characterized by an increase of $500 in income, paid either directly to the individual (and
28presumably entering U(α,θ)) or to the employer, depending on the value of g.
By mapping the re-employment bonus experiment into this framework it becomes pos-
sible to analyze its outcome using a model of endogenous job search and UI eligibility. That
is, the re-employment bonus will aﬀect the propensity to enter UI-eligible unemployment
is embedded within the model. The experiment provides no direct experimental (i.e. con-
trolled) evidence on how the bonus would aﬀect this propensity, because both the treatment
and control groups entered this state under the status quo. However, a model cast in this
framework would need to explain both the treatment and control group outcomes while
accounting for endogenous transitions into unemployment. If successful at crossing this in-
sample hurdle, it is not a great leap for the model to predict accurately the unobserved
situation of a permanent application of the treatment. Tthe ﬁnite and temporary nature of
the bonus, and the fact that its receipt depends on subject action,is fully accounted for by
using the pre-assignment value of outcomes in the post-treatment phase F.
We can contrast this approach to the one taken by Davidson and Woodbury (1993)
that lacked a framework to embed an experiment in a social environment. In their analy-
sis, becoming unemployed and becoming eligible for UI are exogenous parameters calibrated
to pre-assignment outcomes and results from other studies. The analysis thus assumes a
homogeneous population and an unselected group entering the experiment. Policy impli-
cations are then based on an assumption that implementing a reemployment bonus would
leave unchanged the propensity to become unemployed and to establish UI eligibility prior
to becoming unemployed. While the Davidson and Woodbury model is a stationary inﬁnite
horizon environment, experimental outcomes are analyzed as if the re-employment bonus
immediately became an on-going (recurring) policy.
IV.C.2 NIT Experiments
Unlike the Illinois re-employment bonus experiments, the NIT experiments were not
cleanly designed and executed. Here we will just describe how many of the problems with
29the NIT experiments listed by Pencavel (1987) are normalized by this framework. First comes
the strongly selected and widely scattered geographic locations of the experiments. This is
automatically captured by allowing each demographic group to have its own distribution over
unobserved type. (Applying results to non-sampled locations is described in section VII.)
Next, is the fact that entry into the experiment was based on being a low income household.
This simply requires that T(e) = 1, income be an element Y(α,θ), and the feasible condition
be that income is less than some amount. The three-year period of treatment made it unclear
whether short-run or long-run elastiticities were being measured. In the social experiment the
ﬁnite nature of the treatment is explicit, the diﬀerence with a permanent policy innovation
is clear, and the permanence of the treatment eﬀects would be endogenous to the sequential
decision model and the parameters estimated from the data. Next, in some locales the size
of the transfer and the claw-back rate diﬀered across treatment households. This is handled
by specifying more than one treatment group (G > 1). Finally, in some locales assignment
into groups was not random, because households were assignment treatment according to
forecasts designed to minimize the experimental costs. As long as these non-random aspects
of assignment are explicit, the jump process g?
0() can be speciﬁed to handle them. In short,
the framework outlined above coupled with a adequate model of labor supply decisions can
rescue the exogenous variation generated by the NIT experiments from the so-called ﬂaws
in its design.
IV.C.3 Vietnam Draft
A classic example of a natural experiment is the Vietnam draft lottery (Angrist 1990).
The experiment is that each draft board drew birthdates randomly to determine priority in
ﬁlling their draft requirement. Hence, assignment to treatment was based on a demographic
variable. The draft lottery was not a true experiment, because the structure of the lottery
was known ahead of time and the ‘experiment’ could be anticipated by the subjects. Thus
a description of the draft lottery as a social experiment requires E = 0. However, treatment
30was temporary because exposure to the draft was not permanent, and thus τ = 0.
The draft lottery is naturally randomized if date of birth is independent of unobserved
type k. Note that other demographic variables, such as age and parent’s education, can be
included in the social environment and are not required to be independent of birthdate. Yet,
a model of the Vietnam draft lottery as a naturally randomized social experiment resting on
this assumption is problematic on two levels. First, policies such as minimum school entry
age, mandatory school attendance age, and minimum automobile license age, are directly
related to birthdate. They may therefore generate a correlation between birthdate and other
endogenous variables. However, the social experiment is not bound to account for these
policy diﬀerences, and it may be acceptable to ignore them.
At a deeper level the unobserved type k may be correlated with birthdate. For instance,
suppose the model includes unobserved human capital and observed schooling as endogenous
choices. Schooling at age 16 can be treated as a demographic variable, but diﬀerences in
human capital at age 16, conditional on schooling at age 16, would in this environment be
treated as exogenous parameters that diﬀer over unobserved type k. The modeler has the
choice of assuming that the distribution over k is independent of birthdate, which would
result in the draft lottery being a naturally randomized experiment. The fact that local
draft boards conducted their own lotteries can be exploited to avoid assuming that k is
independent of birthdate. A birthdate in one locale with a low draft number could be paired
with the same birthdate in another locale with a high draft number. Location and date of
birth are perhaps safely assumed to be uncorrelated, and it may be possible to pair locales
with similar policy vectors (e.g. similar schooling policies). The result is a social environment
in which the draft is a naturally randomized experiment as deﬁned earlier.
IV.C.4 Non-experimental Lifecycle Data
The requirement that the social environment is stationary is not restrictive in non-









31‘experiment’ can now represent an individual’s lifetime. Iteration on the inﬁnite horizon
value function converges in two iterations. Diﬀerent phases correspond to diﬀerent stages
of decision making generated by policy, such as the age before majority and the age after
mandatory retirement. Transitions must be speciﬁed so that the desired initial distribution
over endogenous states corresponds to the ergodic distribution P−∞{θ}. Otherwise, assuming
a transparent environment means that the initial distribution is not relevant to applying the
model to data, because initial conditions are observed up to the unobserved type k.
V. Predicting Experimental Results
Return to section II, where ˆ E[Y0 | g = 0] and ˆ E[Y1 | g = 1] denoted the sample mean
outcomes within treatment groups. Impact was deﬁned in (1) as the diﬀerence in mean
outcomes. In an experiment with demographic variation, multiple outcomes and treatments,
and repeated observations, impact is a vector conditioned on a subset of the state vectors
θcond introduced in (21). These variables are, by deﬁnition, exogenous to individual outcomes,
conditional on pre-assignment behavior satisfying the sample-selection criteria. This section
derives the conditional mean outcomes in a social experiment and derives their relation to
individual outcomes and individual impact.
V.A Sample Selection
The model of subject behavior generates a stationary distribution across states outside
the experiment, denoted P−∞{θ} and deﬁned in (19). The data generating process begins
with the the experimenter setting t = ¯ t for all points in the state space and then letting the
ordinary transitions take place. The distribution across states at the start of ¯ t + 1, given
type k, is









Requirement R5.2 and the presence of E (the number of experimental groups) in the de-
32nominator ensure that each experimental groups is a copy of the target population. Deﬁne
ω(k;θcond) as the cumulative proportion of type k that has survived selection up to the start






For computational purposes, ω(k;θcond) is not deﬁned as the distribution of k given θcond.
This allows predictions to be computed in parallel for all values of k. Only when predictions
are confronted with data will the distribution across k be ‘ﬁxed up’ using ω(k;θcond) and
λ[d,k].
At t = ¯ t + 1 the selection process for at least one group begins. In these groups the
distribution in the next period will condition on satisfying the ﬁrst entry condition deﬁned
by H[y;θcond]. When t reaches t0 in a group, random assignment to treatment group g and
the initial clock setting takes place between observation of the current result and the start
of period t0 +1. The subject ‘wakes up’ in period t0 +1 either undergoing treatment or in
the control group. By assumption (and for simplicity) they immediately re-optimize given
their initial state and the program of treatment, including the case that a recurring policy
innovation (E = 0, τ > 0) has occurred and their environment has changed forever. The
generalized transition that accounts for selection (feasible histories) and random assignment
is written












H[Y(α,θ);θcond]P {α | θ}. (39)
The assignment B[t = t0]¯ θclock(θexp) is shorthand for saying that the insertion of the initial
clock setting for θ0 occurs only when making the transition from t0 to t0 + 1. (The clock
setting depends on the new value of g which cannot be determined from old outcome when g
is not deterministic. Therefore, initializing the clock cannot be described as a discrete jump
process.)
In general, the conditional distribution of subjects across θ at the start of any period
t ≥ tmin is denoted Ω{θ | k,θcond}. Subjects will choose actions that determine their outcome
33(α,θ) that period. The experimenter measures the outcome Y(α,θ) if the result is feasible.
If so, the subject’s state next period is realized and they will contribute to the distribution
next period. Otherwise they leave the sample and the distribution at t+1 must be corrected
for the proportion of outcomes for which H[y;θcond] = 0. The cumulative proportion of the




















The sequence ω(k;θcond) is non-increasing in t. The distribution across states at any t can
now be deﬁned recursively in terms of the t −1 distribution:




















Note that for t ≤ t0 this distribution only describes subject’s still (partially) eligible for
the sample. The selection in periods until the end of t0 have not yet been imposed. The






At tmin−1 this would equal λ[k,d], if the experiment is randomized. Once selection begins, the
joint distribution of k and d drifts away from the population proportion, because subjects of
diﬀering types have diﬀerent propensities to satisfy the selection criteria in θexp. If selection
ends at t0, then λ? becomes constant for all t > t0:









With attrition, the condition on t would change to the period at which attrition ends.
Implication 3: Solution algorithm. The model of subject behavior and empirical
results in a social experiment can be solved by the algorithm in the Appendix.
V.B Mean Outcomes and Mean Treatment Eﬀects
34The mean observed outcome and the empirical impact in treatment group g are
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where N(θcond) was deﬁned in R3. Using (41), the model analogue to the empirical values
are
E[Y | θcond] =
X
θ
λ?(k|θcond)Ω{θ | k,θcond }E[Y |θ] (46)








The impact in (47) varies over experimental time t and experimental group e for several
reasons. First, the treatment eﬀect itself is non-stationary over t as the subjects progress
through treatment. Given g the treatment is constant, but subjects in diﬀerent experimental
groups entered treatment at diﬀerent stages. Selection into the experiment also creates a non-
stationarity in both treatment and control groups as the distribution across states drifts back
to the unselected distribution P−∞{θ}. That is, if the experimental group e is not a random
sample of the population then the distribution over states in the control group G varies with
experimental time t even though the controls never leave the status quo environment.
It would seem desirable that a particular treatment should have an impact that is not
dependent on the experimental design. Otherwise, there would be little hope of using the
experimental results to make policy-relevant statements outside of the experiment. The
status quo outcome E−∞[Y | d] deﬁned in (23) can stand for the long-run analogue to E[Y1].
It might appear straightforward to deﬁne the analogue to E[Y0] as well, but it is not. The
ﬁrst attempt might be to let the non-stationarity in t die out by looking at outcomes as
t → ∞. After selection ends the distribution over states begins to converge to an ergodic
distribution. This distribution is not the same as P−∞{θ} because the unobserved type k is
also selected, and its distribution is not ergodic. The long-run post-assignment distribution
in group θexp is a re-weighted version of the ergodic distribution for the selection-bias on
unobserved types.
35Implication 4: Long Run Impact.
I4a. For e > 0 or τ = 0,
∀θ, P+∞{θ | θcond} ≡ lim
t→∞
λ?






P−∞{θ | d}. (48)
I4b. For e > 0 the long-run in-sample impact of an experiment or non-recurrent policy
is independent of the treatment program, Ψt.
I4c. In a randomized experiment or in an experiment carried out on a homogeneous
environment, the long-run in-sample impact is zero.
Proof.
P5a. Since d and k are the only invariant states the remaining endogenous states form
an ergodic system. The distribution over states conditional on k and d converges
to P−∞{θ | k,d}. Since k 6∈ θcond, the conditional distribution must correct for the
permanent selection bias in k.















E−∞[Y | k,d] (49)
which is not a function of the treatment program.









. If the environment is ho-
mogeneous λ?
0(1|θobs) = 1. In either event the ultimate impact is zero.
The long-run in-sample impact is not necessarily zero, but only because of selection
on permanent unobserved heterogeneity. The true impact of a treatment on an individual
can, of course, be long-lasting but not permanent. How long treatment lasts depends on
many factors including the transition PS{θ0 | θ}, which determines how quickly a short-term
perturbance gets washed away by the ergodic nature of the social environment.
The point is that in a selected experiment there is no hope of ‘waiting out’ the selection
eﬀects. Even if the eﬀect of sample-selection on transient heterogeneity dies away quickly,
36the treatment eﬀect dies away before selection on unobserved type does. At no point in an
experiment does the selection component of empirical impacts give way to a pure treatment
eﬀect. On the other hand, suppose that there is enough conﬁdence that the experiment was
randomized that the assumption can be maintained. Then if, after a long period past the
end of treatment, the empirical impact does not go to zero one could reject the assumption
of a homogeneous environment.
To restate the problem: in deﬁning a timeless impact of an experimental treatment
applied to a social environment there is no way to disentangle non-stationary selection eﬀects
from non-stationary treatment eﬀects when studying outcomes of an experiment. However,
any social experiment also implies a version of the treatment g in which it becomes policy.
Requirement R4 codiﬁed this by reserving experimental group e = 0 for policy innovations.
37Deﬁnition 4. Policy Outcomes and Impact
D4a. The long-run average eﬀect of implementing treatment g as a policy in demo-
graphic group d is deﬁned as








D4b. The long-run average policy impact of implementing treatment g is
∆∞[d,g] ≡ E+∞[Y | d,g] − E−∞[Y | d]. (51)
The notation and the substance behind (50) resolve both of the problems in using P+∞
to compute long-run impact. First, E+∞[Y | d,g] does depend on g because by deﬁnition
a policy innovation is not a ﬁnite disturbance to the social environment, unless τ(g) = 0.
Second, E+∞ does not depend on the selection criteria, because all experimental groups
are mapped into e = 0 for the purpose of calculating policy innovations. Selection bias is
explicitly avoided by measuring outcomes in phase f = 0 before any selection criteria have
been applied.
V.C Individual Treatment Eﬀects
Reaching farther back into section II we ﬁnd the atheoretic outcomes Y0 and Y1. Unlike
the mean outcomes just discussed, these are two diﬀerent outcomes for a single subject
assigned to treatment and control status. The fundamental problem that social experiments
attempt to solve is that Y0 and Y1 are never both experienced by the same subject. Yet, as
with mean impacts, deﬁning the model equivalents of Y0 and Y1 is not straightforward in a








This reveals a poverty of notation when applying the notation of section II to the dynamic
and uncertain social environment deﬁned in section III. The theoretical result depends on
38the whole state, including possibly unobserved actions, state variables, policy parameters,
and exogenous parameters. Clearly Yg must be considered a random variable deﬁned on a
sample space that includes realizations not available at all possible time periods. Perhaps Yg
is implicitly based on subjective information available at time t0 or perhaps time tmin −1. A
further complication arises when results are measured at a number of periods after random
assignment. In this case the outcome (α,θ) in (52) has date t, but at t0 elements of the
state at t are still unrealized, even given the subject’s information set at time t0. Thus, the
right-hand side of equation (52) is unrealized until t. Until then the outcome can only be an
expectation based on an information set available in a certain period.
More precisely, Yg is supposed to be the answer to the question, “Given what you know
now at time ˜ t, if you were placed in situation g at time t0, what do you expect the result to
be at time t?” As always, t is the date of outcome measurement, t0 is the date of random
assignment, and ˜ t is the date when the expectation is taken. Presumably the information
set does not include realizations after random assignment, because by then the subject is
already reacting to being assigned to g. Hence, ˜ t ≤ t0. But it is also problematic to condition
upon less information than before random assignment. This requires the subject to suspend
knowing that they will be placed in group g only at t0. In other words, for ˜ t ≤ t < t0 the
subject must answer as if they are pretending that they don’t know random assignment
will occur at t0. Without this pretense the actual random assignment occurs at ˜ t and the
treatment is altered because the time between ˜ t and t0 becomes an auxiliary qualiﬁcation
phase. One notion of individual treatment avoids this problem by setting ˜ t = t0.
Deﬁnition 5. Individual Treatment Eﬀects The expected subjective treatment eﬀect is
the expected diﬀerence in results between assignment to a treatment group and a control















39Notice that in the atheoretic framework ∆ = Y0 − Y1. It would be tempting to consider
associating ∆S with E[Y(α,θ) − Y(α,θ)
¯
¯ ¯
g]. Random assignment would appear to imply that
conditioning on assignment as of time t0 has no eﬀect on expectations, making it possible
to interchange the expectation and subtraction operators in (53). However, this is valid
only in special social experiments carried out on special social environments in which the
distribution over states does not depend upon which group the subject is assigned to.
Implication 5: Individual treatment as an expected diﬀerence. When:
I5a. t = t0 +1











Proof. The question is when can treatment impact be expressed as a diﬀerence in results
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This would mean that the impact of the treatment is isolated in conditional choice proba-
bilities at the time of measurement. To show the two conditions are each suﬃcient, express

























P5a. Assignment at t0 takes place after α0 is set, so for s = t0 + 1 there is no distri-
















for any other group g0.
40P5b. For t > t0 + 1 there will be an impact on choice probabilities during periods
t0 + 2,t0 + 3,...,t − 1 unless behavior is irrational. Otherwise, only when the
environment and the treatment are autonomous will the intervening impact have








Even if the social environment is autonomous the experimental treatment may not be.
Since treatment may have a direct eﬀect on measured results, the distribution over θclock must
also not be aﬀected by realized outcomes between t0 and t. In eﬀect nothing subjects do or
experience between time t0 and time t can alter the state distribution. In other environments
and other experiments the subjective impact cannot be expressed as an expected diﬀerence in
results. For example, a myopic environment (δ = 0) is not suﬃcient for the result. Although
myopic subjects place no weight on outcomes between now and t, their myopic choices
between time t0 and time t alter the distribution across states at time t when the environment
and experiment are not autonomous. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, a static decision
framework is neither necessary nor suﬃcient to identify ∆ in (1) with ∆S in (53).
Although the diﬀerence in mean outcomes can be treated as an unbiased estimate of the
mean over individual impacts in a timeless model, in other environments individual subjective
impact as deﬁned above fails to match up with empirical impact in a transparent way.
Does there exist a notion of individual and subjective impact for which (45) is an unbiased
estimate? The answer, obviously, is the notion in which individuals form expectations under
the same information set as the experimenter uses to condition empirical impact.
Implication 6: Subjective treatment eﬀects. The mean treatment eﬀect (45) corre-
sponds to an expected individual eﬀect (53) when:
I6a. the environment is irrational or
I6b. the environment is autonomous and homogeneous, or
I6c. subjects conduct the following thought experiment: they set the probability of
being in any state in the outside environment equal to P−∞{θ | d}; they form the
41expectation conditional upon becoming eligible for the sample; but for tmin ≤ t ≤
t0 they set choice probabilities as if they were ignorant that random assignment
is to occur at the end of t0.
Proof
I6a. Immediate, because the mean and all individual treatment eﬀects are zero.
I6b. This is equivalent to I5, but selection on permanent unobserved heterogeneity
must be ruled out by assuming homogeneity. Otherwise the mean treatment
eﬀect is averaging over unobserved types while an individual conditions on their
own type.
I6c. In the convoluted scenario, the chain of conditional probabilities is exactly that
deﬁned in (39) and (41). One gets the same numerical value when a person is
randomly drawn from the stationary distribution, conditional on d, and forms the
correct conditional expectation. However, this fails to maintain the information
set available to the individual, since the randomly selected person knows their
current state (including their type k).
What happened to the straightforward and intuitively appealing individual impact ∆
as deﬁned in (1). The problem is that (1) conditions on the value of one variable, t, that
is irrelevant to the individual while at the same time integrating out information available
to and pertinent to the individual (type, initial state, and experimental clock). Therefore
diﬀerences between mean outcomes within groups cannot typically be interpreted as the
average of treatment eﬀects felt by individuals.
42VI. Estimation and Inference
VI.A Likelihood
The exogenous vector θexog introduced in (16) contains all parameters to estimate from
the experimental results, including type proportions within demographic groups.
Implication 7: Likelihood. Under R1 - R5:
I7a. The post-assignment likelihood function for subject n of measurement group θobs
is denoted L
³
ˆ θexog ; n,θobs
´
and can be computed through backward recursion:
L
³
ˆ θexog ; θ,tmax +1,θobs
´
≡ 1
for t0 ≤ t ≤ tmax,
L
³



































ˆ θexog ; θ0 ,t0 +1,n
´
. (55)
I7b. The full-sample log-likelihood function is
lnL
³














ˆ θexog ; y
´
is a smooth function of ˆ θexog on ˆ Θexog.
























t ) is shorthand for the unique solution to Y(αn
t ,θn
t ) = yn(θcond).
I7e. In a transparent and homogeneous environment where Υ is identiﬁed, consistent
estimates of Υ can be computed without solving the value function.
43I7f. The likelihood for pre-random assignment results requires the joint distribution
of θ for tmin ≤ t < t0, the Cartesian product of the outcome space (excluding θexp
and θclock) on itself t0 − tmin times.
I7g. For an irrational type (ρk ≈ 0) the discount factor δk and exogenous parameters




I7c. By Implication I1 all probabilities are smooth in θexog. Ω{θ|k,θcond} is smooth in
P {α|θ} and Ps, and the likelihood is smooth in Ω.
I7d. With transparency the state is observable up to k, and the sums over α and θ0 in
(57) collapse to a single factor.
I7e. With homogeneity Υ is identiﬁed from observable conditional choice probabilities.
I7f. By R1, P {α|θ} = 1/|A(θ)| for an irrational type, which is not a function of Υk
and δk. The likelihood would be ﬂat in these parameters.
The ergodic distribution P−∞ accounts for the distribution of subjects across all invariant
states, including unobserved type k which must be integrated out of the likelihood. The post-
random assignment likelihood () integrates out pre-assignment results, because in general
it is not feasible to exploit information prior to t0. The measurements at t0 contribute to
the likelihood even though assignment takes place after the measurement is made. The
expression in () assumes that those losing eligibility at t0 are not included in the sample.
Although the distribution in (39) is relatively simple to compute for t < t0, it only expresses
the distribution across states for subjects partially eligible for their experimental group.
The distribution across states in period t < t0 for subjects who are ultimately eligible for
random assignment requires tracking from t0 back to period t. This goes against the Markov
(sequential) nature of the subject’s behavior and the selection criteria. The extra information
44required to track the likelihood back from t0 builds up exponentially with the length of
the selection criteria. Unless the selection period is short, or the model itself has a small
state space, the extended state space required by pre-assignment results will be infeasible to
compute.
Rust (1994) provides the concentrated likelihood in transparent and homogeneous envi-
ronments. Several other algorithms for estimating dynamic programming models assume a
transparent and/or homogeneous environment. For example, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)
maintain transparency and homogeneity. In a related paper, Arcidiacono and Jones (2002)
relax homogeneity. Keane and Wolpin (1997) assume transparency but not homogeneity.
Because the utility and discount factor are unidentiﬁed under the null hypothesis of an
irrational environment, inference is non-standard. However, some parameters in Π may be
identiﬁed in an irrational environment. In particular, any state variables that are included
in the result vector will allow identiﬁcation of parameters of the discrete jump process that
drives those variables.
VI.B Impact-based Estimates
There are several reasons why maximum likelihood estimates of the exogenous parame-
ters may be infeasible or unattractive. First, the burden of calculating the likelihood may be
large, particularly if the environment is transparent. When the environment is not transpar-
ent the subject’s choices are based on more information than available in y. The likelihood
must integrate out these choices. Second, the likelihood is exacting. Any inconsistencies be-
tween the model experiment and the actual experiment can lead to zero-probability events
appearing in y. Finally, data on individual subjects may not be available to the researcher
because experimental results are often proprietary due to informed-consent laws.
These concerns lead to consideration of estimating θexog from averaged data. Deﬁne ˇ ∆
as the diﬀerence between predicted and observed mean outcomes:
ˇ ∆(θcond) ≡ ˆ E[Y | θcond] − E[Y | θcond]. (58)
45By adding and subtracting a term, the empirical impact can be expressed as








The empirical impact is a combination of theoretical outcomes and diﬀerences between the-
oretical and empirical outcomes. A set of reported impacts can be interpreted as reporting a
particular mixture of theoretical and empirical moments. In an unrestricted impact analysis
the mean outcomes in control groups are taken as given and not determined by ˆ ∆(θcond).











MB[N(θcond) > 0] (60)
denote the number of moments. The number of free parameters in an impact analysis is
the number of impacts NU = NM(G−1)/G. A social experiment V model places two kinds of
restrictions on an impact analysis. First, a social experiment is a model of subject behavior
where the number of parameters equals P < NU. Second, the social experiment predicts the
outcomes in control groups as well as treatment groups. This provides additional within-
sample restrictions on the social experiment model.








A(θcond) ˇ ∆(θcond). (61)
where A(θcond) is a M × M positive-deﬁnite matrix.
Implication 8: Impact-based estimation. Given an social experiment E,
I8a. The empirical impact in (45) can be considered an estimate of reduced-form
parameters of the model, ∆(θcond).
I8b. ˆ θIE
exog is a hypothesis nested by an impact analysis ˆ ∆(θcond). The number of
over-identifying restrictions on ˆ θIE
exog is DF ≥ NM − P − D.
I8c. In an experiment with an entry period, the null hypothesis of a myopic environ-




P8c. An entry period by deﬁnition has no aﬀect on utility. In a static environment con-
trol and treatment groups will behave the same during the entry period, leading
to a prediction of zero impact during the ﬁrst R(1) periods of the experiment.
In short, impact analysis cannot be rejected in favor of a social experiment model, E,
but it can fail to improve the ﬁt enough to justify rejection of an estimated model using
conventional tests. The ﬁnal result also suggests that social experiment framework itself
helps with identiﬁcation of parameters of a dynamic program. Rust (1994) shows that a
dynamic programming model is unidentiﬁed non-parametrically. The discount factor is a
key parameter that itself cannot be identiﬁed without assuming parametric structure. The
social experiment makes assumptions about the utility and transition, but by deﬁnition the
presence of, say, an entry period is not a freely estimated parameter. Thus, within this
structure P8c indicates that the value of the discount factor can yield testable implications
about the outcomes of experiments.
VII. Applications and Extensions
VII.A Out-of-Sample Prediction
An out-of-sample prediction is deﬁned as using estimates within the same social environ-
ment V that surrounds the experiment. I8 says that an impact analysis uses up all degrees of
freedom in the information contained in mean outcomes concerning the social environment,
leaving no freedom to predict outcomes beyond the end of the sample, t > tmax. By contrast,
predictions using the social experiment framework are based on estimates of the exogenous
47parameters, for example based on ˆ θexog = ˆ θIE




ˆ E[Y | θ] ˆ Ω{ˆ θ | k,θcond}. (62)
Further, point estimates of the exogenous parameters come with an estimated distribution,
ˆ H(ˆ θIE
exog). Subject to onerous calculations, a conﬁdence interval can be placed around point
forecasts of out-of-sample outcomes.
Outcomes can be predicted for hypothetical treatments and selection criteria by simply
including them in θexp with sample proportions equal to zero. Hypothetical experiments
conducted in the same environment would be based on the same result function Y(α,θ), and
these predictions would have a well-deﬁned conﬁdence interval associated with them. As with
any out-of-sample predictions, the conﬁdence interval widens with the distance between the
hypothetical conditions and the in-sample conditions. In the case of a social experiment, the
more diﬀerent the hypothetical selection criteria and program of treatment are from those
in the experiment, the less conﬁdence would be placed on any predictions.
VII.B Out-of-Population Prediction
An out-of-population prediction uses the estimated model in a diﬀerent social environ-
ment, denoted V⊥. For simplicity, consider a hypothetical social environment with a single
demographic group (D⊥ = 1) that diﬀers from the estimated environment in just four re-
spects. The new demographic group faces its own policy vector θ⊥
pol; it has its own distribu-
tion of unobserved types Λ⊥; it is measured using its own vector Y ⊥; and data are based on
its own set of experimental groups θ⊥
exp.
This environment can be resolved completely to make predictions for ‘real world’ results.
In this case, both the pre- and post-assignment ergodic distributions diﬀer from P−∞ and
must be re-computed. With an additional statement that describes feasible histories that
accord with Y ⊥, the results of carrying out the social experiment in the novel environment
also fall out automatically. In other words, a hypothetical experiment E⊥ can be designed
48and simulated on an hypothetical environment V⊥ based on information gathered from an
experiment conducted in another environment.
When demographic variables are segregated from unobserved and estimated parameters
as in done in the deﬁnition of a social environment, then out-of-population predictions are
simpler, if not necessarily better or more accurate. Only the hypothetical policy vector
must be observed. Without making ad hoc assumptions, the estimated exogenous vectors
are inserted into the state space as the values pertaining to the hypothetical environment.
The individual’s problem is solved for the policy vector for each unobserved type k. What
remains to be determined are the type proportions λ⊥. This requires a vector y⊥ of moments
drawn from the experimental group with at least K − 1 elements. In the worst case this
vector could simply be the mean outcomes from the unselected population as long as the
measurement vector is longer than the number of unobserved types. The type proportions
are then chosen to match the data:
Deﬁnition 7. Out-of-population Environment. Given an estimated social environment
ˆ V, an out-of-population environment ˆ V⊥
³
Y ⊥,y⊥,Ψ⊥

















ˆ Λ⊥ ˆ Γ
´
ˆ Λ⊥ = arg min
Λ⊥∈ΞK




0 H⊥[y⊥;θcond] · · ·
´
.
The presence of · in a deﬁnition indicates parameters that are irrelevant to the deﬁnition.
A out-of-population environment has no experimental treatment program, but the single
group e = g = G = E = 0 must be deﬁned to indicate how the data are generated. The
length of the selection period T is zero, which is a normalization since there no exogenous
49variation needs to be inserted. (The sample may still be selected after t0 as indicated by
H⊥[·].) The data-gathering process must be described because the out-of-population mixture
across types is estimated using GMM on the available data.
Individual problems need to be solved exactly K times in order to solve ˆ λ⊥ iteratively.
The extent to which estimates from a social experiment can or should be applied in other
contexts depends on the quality of data available from elsewhere and, of course, the ability
of the estimated model to predict behavior for out-of-sample policies.
Segregating observed variation from unobserved variation and using a ﬁnite-mixture to
model unobserved variation leads to straightforward applications of the model to populations
not eligible for the experiment. In contrast, the more common way of including policy and
demographic information parameters within a model is to interact the in-sample index d
directly with the exogenous parameter vector Γ. For example, consider a case in which
requirement R2 is violated by including a dummy-variable for, say, race in a wage equation.
To apply the estimated model out of sample would require that race is observed in Y ⊥ or the
eﬀect of race must be integrated out of the predictions. In either case, it is assumed that race
plays the same role in the target population as in the original population. This assumption
is not necessary under R2, which would assume that people categorized as diﬀerent races
behave in observably diﬀerent ways because they are a diﬀerent mixture of the underlying
types k.
VII.C Randomization and Attrition Bias
Randomization bias occurs when individuals agree to participate in the experiment,
but then when their assignment is revealed they make a second choice to continue or not.
When participation in the experiment is costly to the subjects, and the treatment is valued
diﬀerently than the status quo, this leads to a bias in estimated impacts. Related to this
issue is attrition bias: if subjects drop from study at a rate that depends on the treatment,
then the attrition rate will diﬀer between the treatment and control group.
50It is straightforward to allow for endogenous attrition in the social experiment. Let α
contain a choice variable j which equals one when the subject agrees to participate in the
next period. Thus, for t ≥ t0, H[y;θcond] = j. Typically j = 0 implies that f0 = F. That is,
non-participation means treatment ends and the subject returns to the real world. Suppose
further that the cost of participation is an additive component of utility:




where κ ∈ Υ and u?(α,θ) is the utility augmented by the participation decision. Given that the
subject has participated up to the current period, they will participate again if the current
value plus discounted future expected value of treatment outweighs the cost κ. Only when





> κ. In any case, the decision depends on all the exogenous parameters
and the realized state a subject ﬁnds themselves in. For example, subjects with less to gain
from the treatment (perhaps because they are less patient and have lower values of δ) are
more likely to drop out conditional on the realized state.
To control for randomization bias requires a slight extension of the model, because this
bias is caused by a lag between a subject’s agreeing to participate in the experiment and
being assigned treatment status g. To account for this lag, t0 now represents the period
at which the experiment is revealed and participation is requested. Phase f = 1 would
now denote the period between the initial decision to participate and the date of random
assignment. R[1] is the maximum lag between a baseline survey and random assignment.
Phase 2 is the ﬁrst true phase of treatment. During phase 1, g is a discrete jump process that
will take on a new value when the subject makes the jump out of phase 1. Phase 1 would
in most cases by an entry period as deﬁned above. The extended utility u? implies that the
decision to drop out (and, hence, random assignment bias) is a function of the discounted
expected value of treatment and the status quo situation all conditional upon information
available to the subject. Thus, subjects who initially agreed to participate based on () may
drop out once their group assignment is realized. (If full records are kept at t0, often called
51the baseline interview, then the initial decision to participate can also be modelled using u?.)
VII.D Measurement Error
As discussed earlier, maximum likelihood estimation is sensitive to the assumption that
measurements are made without error. True measurement error and discrepancies between
reality and the model can generate zero-probability observations that leave the likelihood
function undeﬁned. This can be seen in the main component of the likelihood deﬁned in
() which contains the Boolean component B[yn(θcond) = Y(α,θ)]. We can extend the model
by specifying that outcomes are subject to independent normally-distributed errors. The
exogenous vector is expanded to take the form:
θexog ≡ (Λ Γ Σ) (65)
where Σ is a M-vector of standard deviations in results, Σ = [σm]. The Boolean component













(The division by Σ is element-by-element, and a scaling constant would also appear.) The
measurement error would not aﬀect the progress of the experiment through the transition
rule f+(y;θclock). The likelihood function is not reliant on ‘transparency’ of the state and
action vector, so the same general form applies in the case of this type of measurement error.
VII.E Non-stationary Environments and Stochastic Policies
If at some level the environment is not ergodic then it is not clear how experimental
results, however obtained, could be useful ex post to address policy questions. When subject
behavior is non-stationary before and after the experiment, then the same subjects will never
be in the same position to react to true policy changes that occur after the experiments end.
A good reason to relax the assumption of stationarity is to allow subjects to make decisions
while facing a ﬁnite horizon, for example in anticipation of retirement or death. Another
52good reason is to have individuals make decisions starting from an initial distribution over
states that is not endogenous to the model. As discussed earlier, lifecycle data that does
not include random assignment can be modelled as a program of treatment within a special
(trivial) stationary environment. But to include lifecycle eﬀects and experimental treatment,









a=1), are both determined
by exogenous parameters and not by endogenous choices. Dying agents are ‘re-born’ at a = 1
and the overall stationarity required for drawing lessons for policy is restored through an
overlapping generations framework. The allowance for policy innovations as e = 0 means
that the transition path between the old and new steady-states are computable within the
framework already described.
Recently Keane and Wolpin (2002) have examined the eﬀect of uncertain changes in
government policies within a model of welfare. In the basic deﬁnition of a social environment
the policy vector takes on a singe value, and the demographic variable d serves as a permanent
index into the policy vector. It is straightforward (albeit expensive) to allow the values in
the policy vector to follow a discrete jump process, d0 = d?(d,[πd],[{d}]). The possible realized
values of policy parameters would be pre-determined and the parameters of the discrete
jump process could be estimated inside or outside the model. As with Keane and Wolpin’s
framework, this allows expectations that heretofore unobserved regimes (such as introduction
or elimination of a program) can aﬀect current behavior. Policy experiments would then be
conducted by letting the government set the realized values of policy parameters and/or
their transition probabilities.
VII.F Equilibrium Environments
Equilibrium can be consider a restriction on the environment that subjects face. For
example, in a partial equilibrium environment, prices are parametric to all individual agents
and the modeler. In a general equilibrium the prices remain parametric to agents but become
53endogenous to the modeler’s choice or estimates of underlying preference and technology
parameters. In many cases we can associate equilibrium outcomes with certain elements of
the policy vector Ψp. For example, rather than treat prices as given, they would have to
satisfy an endogenous restriction: h(Ψp) = 0, where all the implied optimizing behavior and
aggregate outcomes are implicit in h(·). Solving the model would require ﬁnding exogenous
parameters that satisfy this restriction. Alternatively, the econometric objective can be
penalized for a failure to satisfy these restrictions. In this approach the equilibrium prices
are elements of the exogenous vector. Ferrall (2002a) discusses the computational tradeoﬀs
between these two approaches to imposing equilibrium in a general class of problems of which
a social experiment is a special case.
Combining equilibrium restrictions and small-scale experiments require special consid-
eration (Heckman et al. 1998). The framework here makes it straightforward to include
equilibrium responses only when appropriate. For f = F one equilibrium restriction is im-
posed within and perhaps across demographic groups. Any case of e > 0 is an experiment
within the same equilibrium, presuming N(θobs) is small. A case of e = 0 will require com-
puting new equilibrium restrictions whether it is an hypothetical or real policy innovation
being analyzed.
VIII. Conclusion
All economic policy interventions, whether carried out as an experiment or not, change
the incentives and constraints faced by the agents in the economy. These changes cre-
ate a backdrop of ‘exogenous variation’ against which to measure individual and aggregate
responses. The literature on social and natural experiments usually casts the analysis of
exogenous variation in a static framework, although all such interventions have dynamic
eﬀects, whether intended or not.
A commonly held preconception is that experiments and quasi-experiments can be inter-
54preted without a model of subject response to the experiment. This preconception has been
challenged by Hotz et. al (1999), Ichimura and Taber(2000), and Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(2000) on both practical and theoretical grounds. This paper folds their objections into a
general framework that deﬁnes an experiment as an unexpected change in an environment
that is already dynamic and uncertain. The element of surprise is a maintained hypothe-
sis about the distribution of unobserved states at the time of assignment to experimental
groups. The environments and experiments in which the intuition from static frameworks
carries through can be described. They are found to be a small and uninteresting subset of
the set of environments and experiments deﬁned here. As alternative to these unappealing
assumptions, a constructive set of tools are developed here for designing, estimating, and
applying a complete model of a social experiment under general conditions.
To implement this framework for a particular experiment can entail a great deal of nota-
tion and computational costs. The return is a model that is parsimonious in free parameters.
In particular, the model can be seen as a restriction placed on the analysis of experimental
impact, which in itself has no power to predict outside the experiment under either the null
hypothesis that the model is true or the alternative. In addition, the cost of extending the
estimated model to other environments is relatively cheap. The solution and estimation
of the social experiment is an upfront cost which makes multiple applications inexpensive
on the margin. Whether the computational cost and attention to detail demanded by the
framework are worthwhile depends on the quality of the situation under study and the model
chosen to explain it, as well as how the results are to be put to use.
55IX. Appendix
Coordinating time across groups.
a. For e > 0, let the initial clock have elements (t0 +1 rc fc). Let ¯ r(e) ≡ rc +
Pfc−1
x=1 R(x) be an index of how far into the program the group enters treatment.
Set t0(z) ≡ 0, where z ≡ argmaxθexp¯ r(θexp) is the group that enters treatment at
the latest stage.
b. Set t0 in other groups so that members of the group cannot reach treatment state
¯ θclock(z) before t = 0: t0(θexp) ≡ −[¯ r(¯ θclock(z)) −¯ r(θexp)].
c. Set tmin to be 1 + t0 − T(e). Set tmax as t0 plus the length of post-assignment
observations in the group.
d. For e = 0, set f0 = f?(1,0,0)for (α,θ) ∈ h¯ t, and ¯ t = mine tmin(e) −1.
Solution algorithm.
a. Set d = D, k = K, f = F, r = 1, g = G, e = E.
b. Set policy parameters Ψd = θpol[d].
c. Set exogenous parameters Γ = θend[k].
d. Iterate on (7) for all θend except k and d to ﬁnd V(θ) to a speciﬁed tolerance.
e. Compute choice probabilities (P {α|θ} in ) and solve the stationary distribution
(P−∞ in ) for the current value of k and d. See Judd (1998 p. 85) for details.
f. Decrease f by 1 and set r = R[f]. Iterate back to r = 1 solving for value functions
and choice probabilities.
g. Repeat the previous step through f = 1.
h. If e = 0, g < G and τ > 0, then set V0 = VF iterate on the inﬁnite horizon problem
in () to a speciﬁed tolerance.
i. Set t = tmin. Compute E−∞[Y | d], ω(k;θcond) and Ω{θ|k,θcond}.
j. Increase t by 1. Update Ω and ω . If t = t0 then reset clock to ¯ θclock.
56k. Repeat previous step until t = tmax.
l. Decrease g by 1. Set f = F and return to step f until g = 0.
m. Decrease e by 1. Set g = G −1 and return to step f through e = 1.
n. Decrease k by one. Set e = E and return to step c through k = 1.
o. Compute E[Y] =
P
k λ[d,k]E[Y] for all g,e,t.
p. Decrease d. Set k = K and return to step b through d = 1.
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